¹Ý°øÆ÷·Î ¼®¹æ The day after President Rhee released the anti-Communist POW¡¯s, President Eisenhower got extremely agitated and upset, and sent a communication to President Rhee through Ambassador Briggs.
If the U.S. cannot get cooperation from President Rhee, the U.S. may have to reconsider the relationship with S. Korea. Rhee read the letter and responded as follows:
¡°If the U.S. and the Republic of Korea have to go separate ways, then let us part as friends in all aspects. We thank you for all the help to date, but we cannot accept ceasefire with the Chinese in our land. That would be our ¡®death sentence.¡¯ Only history will judge us. Even if that means suicide for us, it is our prerogative.
Eisenhower was taken aback when Rhee countered with ¡®S. Korea would go alone.¡¯ He thought the ceasefire talk could crash if Rhee held out to the end. Eisenhower dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson as the Special Envoy to Rhee. It was a matter of survival to Rhee, while the U.S. sought honorable withdrawal from the war.
¡ã ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ÆÄ°ßÇÑ Æ¯ÀÓ´ë»ç ·Î¹öÆ®½¼ÀÌ °æ¹«´ë·Î À̽¸¸À» ¹æ¹®ÇØ ¾Ç¼öÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù.(1953.7) ·Î¹öÆ®½¼Àº 3ÁÖÀϵ¿¾È ³¯¸¶´Ù À̽¸¸À» ¸¸³ª À̽¸¸ÀÌ ³»³õÀº ÈÞÀüÇÕÀÇ Á¶°ÇµéÀ» ÇùÀÇÇÏ´À¶ó Áø¶¡À» »°´Ù. President Rhee repeated over and over to Robertson, ¡°the Korean War was not an internal civil war, but a war between the communism and the democracy. Only a victory in this war will stop the international communists¡¯ advances and stop what China had become.¡±
Running nonstop marathon meetings with President Rhee, the Special Envoy Robertson reported back to the State Department as follows: ¡°President Syngman Rhee seems to be a leader of conviction who can very well lead his country to a suicidal path with his belief that the ceasefire agreement would give what the communists wanted through the talk, which they could not get through military invasion.¡±
Robertson advised the State Department that they should try to convince Rhee that it would be best for him to cooperate with the U.S. if he really wants to get his ultimate objective. Robertson said the U.S. should apply pressure at times. He was in fact siding with Rhee in his report.
¡°President Rhee led his people to fight against the Communists aggression. No world leader, including the U.S., could have done it. We have to honor and encourage such a will and spirit, not to discourage it. Furthermore, Rhee¡¯s army we helped build through this war is the most powerful and well equipped forces in Asia against the Communists.
¡ã ´ú·¹½º(¿ÞÂÊ)¿Í ·Î¹öÆ®½¼À» ´Ù½Ã ¸¸³ª ȯ´ãÇÏ´Â À̽¸¸ ´ëÅë·É, `¹Ì±ºÀÇ ¹«±âÇÑ ÁÖµÐ` Á¶¾à ¼º°ø½ÃÄ×´Ù..."ÀÚ¼Õ¸¸´ë ¹ø¿µÀÇ Åä´ë"¸¶·Ã We need them more than anybody else.¡± While South Korea and the U.S. would not give in to each other, Robertson offered three major points of agreement to President Rhee:
1) The U.S. government will enter into a mutual defense treaty with South Korea, which will be similar to the defense treaty with the Philippines. The U.S. government is ready to offer it to South Korea.
2) The U.S. government will provide necessary aid to equip the South Korean forces stronger.
3) The U.S. government will provide comprehensive economic aid to S. Korea to recover from the war and rebuild the country.
However, President Rhee would not have it. He reminded Envoy Robertson how the U.S. betrayed Korea in 1904 to the Imperial Japan, and their betrayal in 1945. Rhee protested to Robertson that Korea could not trust such an ally. Another impasse.
Robertson tried again with the same offer the following day, but Rhee would not have it again. President Rhee reiterated again and again he wanted reunification and that the U.S. should fight against the Communists with S. Korea if the ceasefire talk did not work out. Robertson protested that it was not possible due to the limitations included in the U.S. Constitution.
To this, Rhee answered as follows: ¡°I know why the U.S. politicians hesitate to restart this war and that they are all afraid of the possible World War III. I don¡¯t want World War III either. However, if we go alone with this war, I hope the U.S. will at least support us morally and with materials.
If the Mutual Defense Treaty does not get confirmed by the U.S. Senate, I cannot tell my people the ceasefire talk is helpful to S. Korea.¡± Robertson planned to conclude the talk with Rhee on that day, but instead was persuaded by Rhee that more assurances were needed for Rhee from the U.S. side.
1953³â 8¿ù 8ÀÏ º¯¿µÅ ¿Ü¹«Àå°ü°ú ´î·¯½º ¹Ì±¹¹«Àå°üÀÌ Çѹ̻óÈ£¹æÀ§Á¶¾à °¡Á¶ÀνĿ¡¼ ¼¸íÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù.µÚ¿¡¼ À̸¦ ÁöÄѺ¸´Â À̽¸¸ÀÇ Ç¥Á¤ÀÌ ¹àÁö¸¸Àº ¾Ê´Ù. He felt he should persuade the U.S. side. On the night of July 6th, Robertson sent a suggestion to the State Department that President Eisenhower should talk to the leaders of the both parties at the Senate and get pledges from them they would support the Mutual Defense Treaty if it was sent to the Senate for confirmation.
President Rhee made another point to Special Envoy Robertson that the Treaty draft offered by the U.S. did not have automatic involvement provision. Not like the Philippines, Australia or New Zealand, South Korea faced direct assault from North Korea anytime.
The Mutual Defense Treaty should include automatic instantaneous troop dispatchment by the U.S. if and when a war breaks out again. President Rhee wanted a treaty similar to the one the U.S. entered with Japan, where the U.S. troops were stationed in the main island and other areas of Japan.
Robertson accepted Rhee¡¯s demand the following day. This talk between President Rhee and Envoy Robertson ended in complete favor to Rhee¡¯s demands and wishes. South Korea was guaranteed for its future, prosperity in freedom and peace for the future generations.